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Abstract 
We quantify the competitive effects of removing vertical restraints, based on the 
recent proposals  to liberalize the selective and exclusive distribution system in the 
European car market.  We estimate a differentiated products demand system for  new 
cars and specify a  model of oligopoly pricing under the current distribution regime. 
We then perform several policy experiments:  the creation of international intrabrand 
competition (cross-border trade) and a possible strenghtening of national intrabrand 
competition.  Our approach may also  be useful to assess the competitive effects  of 
vertical restraints in other applications. 
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1 1  Introduction 
Vertical agreements between firms  have been the subject of a long and intense debate in 
competition policy.  In the U.S. the debate has focused around the question of which type of 
vertical restraints should be per se illegal, and which can be treated under a rule of reason 
approach.  Price restraints (resale price maintenance) have generally been treated as per se 
illegal.  Non-price restraints, such as exclusive territories, have often received a rule of reason 
treatment, implying a consideration of both anti-competitive effects and efficiencies.  In the 
E.  U.  vertical restraints are prohibited, but exemptions are allowed  when efficiencies  occur 
and consumers receive a fair  part the resulting benefits.1  The E.U. thus roughly follows  a 
rule of reason approach by accounting for both the anti-competitive effects and efficiencies of 
vertical restraints. An important additional concern in Europe has typically been the extent 
to which the vertical restraints are compatible with the common  market and achieve  the 
goals of economic integration.  Despite this additional concern, it seems fair to say that the 
E.U. has followed a more lenient approach than the U.S., which is  reflected in the number 
of granted individual exemptions and block exemptions for  vertical restraints. 
The selective and exclusive distribution system for  the European car market is  a well-
known example of a block exemption. It has been in place since 1985 and institutionalized a 
series of previously existing vertical restraints as acceptable practices for the whole industry. 
The system allows manufacturers to select authorized dealers and to assign them territorial 
exclusivity.  The industry has defended the system based on efficiency considerations, such 
as the need to control a dealer network that offers high quality sales and after-sales services. 
At the same time, consumer organizations have pointed out the potential anti-competitive 
effects arising from the system and the conflict with the European integration objectives.  In 
particular, it has been argued that the distribution system offers only limited opportunity for 
cross-border arbitrage to eliminate the large and persistent international price differentials. 
Since the block exemption expires in September 2002,  the European Commission has 
prepared a  detailed investigation into the benefits and the costs of alternative distribution 
systems.  The result of this investigation is  a new Regulation to create a system that gen-
erates more flexibility.  It allows the manufacturers to impose either selectivity or territorial 
exclusivity on their dealers, but no longer a combination of both.2  The result of the proposed 
liberalization is the promotion of intrabrand competition, i.e.  competition between dealers 
of the same brand, both at the national and at the international level.  This may lead to a 
1 Art.  81  (1)  of the Treaty of  Rome contains the prohibition part, whereas  Art.  81  (3)  refers  to the 
conditions under which exemptions are allowed.  Note that Art. 81  applies to horizontal agreements as well. 
2The  new  Regulation  is  available  at  the  Commission's  car  sector  website  at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car...sector. 
2 reduction in several anti-competitive distortions.  At the international level,  the promotion 
of intrabrand competition has the effect  of eliminating the feasibility of international price 
discrimination.  At the national level,  the promotion of intrabrand competition may have 
the additional effect of eliminating a double marginalization problem, which can serve as a 
tacit collusion device to reduce the degree of competition between manufacturers. 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the competitive effects from the proposed liber-
alizations of the vertical restraints.  To  accomplish this, we  progress in several steps.  First, 
we estimate a differentiated products demand model for new cars.  Next, we specify oligopoly 
pricing under the current distribution system with selectivity and exclusivity.  We consider 
two  possible scenarios.  In the first  scenario,  the current system only limits international 
intrabrand competition, and  hence enables  international price discrimination.  In the sec-
ond scenario, the current system also limits national intrabrand competition and hence may 
serve as  a tacit collusion device in addition to a  price discrimination mechanism.  Finally, 
we  specify oligopoly pricing after liberalization and quantify the price and welfare changes 
in  the new equilibrium.  There are two possible changes from liberalization.  International 
intrabrand competition is stimulated, so that the incentives for international price discrim-
ination decline.  Furthermore, national intrabrand competition may be created, at least to 
the extent that this was  effectively limited before liberalization (Le.  the second scenario). 
This implies the tacit collusion device is eliminated. 
Our analysis indicates that liberalizing the vertical restraints would have the following 
effects under the two alternative scenarios. 
(1)  If the existing system already entails sufficient  national intrabrand compe-
tition, then liberalization mainly leads to a reduction in international price dis-
crimination.  Consumer surplus and total welfare  may increase by an  amount 
between zero and 1.6-2 billion Euro per year, depending on whether there are 
differences in conduct across countries (Le.  collusion). 
(2) If the existing system effectively limits national intrabrand competition, then 
liberalization may lead to both reduced international price discrimination and 
to the elimination of tacit collusion.  The computed consumer and welfare gains 
become much larger:  consumer surplus would increase by about 10%, and total 
welfare would go up by 6-8 billion Euro per year.  We warn, however, that these 
large competitive gains must be balanced against potentially large efficiency losses 
in this case.  Indeed, we also find that the manufacturing sector would experience 
a very substantial profit increase from liberalization, so that the existing system 
(the result of intensive industry efforts)  may presumably only be rationalized by 
3 the presence important efficiencies. 
In sum, the policy maker may either adopt the first scenario (i.e.  assume the current system 
does not limit national intrabrand competition) and arrive at annual welfare gains between 
zero  and 1.6-2  billion  Euro.  Or  it may  adopt the second  scenario  and arrive  at much 
larger competitive gains,  but then a more detailed quantification of the efficiency losses is 
indispensable. 
During the past decade competition policy has spent an increasing amount of attention 
to oligopoly models with differentiated products to quantify competitive effects.  This trend 
has been limited exclusively  to the analysis of horizontal  mergers.  For  studies based on 
actual cases and/or hypothetical mergers, see Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Werden 
and Froeb (1994),  Jayaratne and Shapiro (2000), Nevo  (2000),  Ivaldi and Verboven (2001) 
and Pinkse and Slade (2001).  Our analysis shows that empirical oligopoly models can also 
assist in other areas of antitrust, such as vertical restraints, provided that the assumptions 
on oligopoly  behavior  are appropriately modified.  The merger  studies  typically  assume 
multi-product price-setting firms, and consider the effects of changing the product ownership 
matrix.  Our oligopoly model explicitly accounts for  the effects of selectivity and territorial 
exclusivity on international and national intrabrand competition.  We  model international 
intrabrand competition by imposing constraints on cross-country markup differentials after 
liberalization.  See  Davidson,  Dewatripont,  Ginsburgh  and Labbe  (1989)  for  a  simplified 
theoretical framework  with  price  constraints.  National intrabrand competition,  and the 
possible absence thereof before liberalization, is modelled by explicitly specifying the strategic 
interaction between the manufacturers and retailers.  This was inspired by Rey and Stiglitz' 
(1995) theoretical analysis of tacit collusion under territorial exclusivity.3 
The outline of the paper is  as  follows.  In section  2 we  discuss  the role  of  selectivity 
and exclusivity in reducing international and national intrabrand competition (with a more 
detailed analysis in the Appendix).  This section serves as the basis for  the specification of 
the model, which is  developed in  section 3.  Section  4 presents the parameters estimates 
based on a large data set for  the car market before liberalization.  Section 5 discusses the 
3To model the absence of intrabrand competition before liberalization, we  generalized Rey and Stiglitz' 
(1995)  model to fit  the details of the European car market.  During the writing of this paper, we  became 
aware of an emerging empirical literature in marketing that is  closely related to our empirical model of the 
manufacturer-retailer relationship and that grew independent of Rey and Stiglitz' analysis and our empirical 
application. See  Sudhir (2001),  Villas-Boas and Zhao (2001)  and Berto Villas-Boas (2002).  Whereas these 
papers focus on testing alternative models of vertical interaction, our focus is on simulating the changes in 
equilibrium to liberalization.  A common feature of both approaches is that wholesale prices (in addition to 
marginal costs) are not observed, but rather recovered from a model of the manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
4 effects of the liberalization on prices, profits and welfare.  Extensions and conclusions follow 
in section 6. 
2  The selective and exclusive distribution system 
2.1  The current system and proposals for reform 
We  begin with a review of the essential features of the selective and exclusive distribution 
system for cars, and the recently proposed liberalization measures.  The Appendix provides a 
considerably more detailed discussion.  Selectivity and territorial exclusivity have in common 
that they restrict the number of authorized distributors and the possibilities of resale.  The 
difference lies in how these restrictions work.  Selectivity means that each manufacturer can 
choose its dealers,  based on  qualitative or  quantitative criteria.  To  protect the selective 
relationship, the manufacturer can prohibit its dealers to sell cars to independent resellers. 
Dealers may thus only set! to end-consumers, or to intermediaries with a written consumer 
authorization.  Territorial exclusivity refers to the manufacturers' right to appoint only one 
dealer in a geographically limited territory.  Dealers can therefore not maintain branches 
outside their own  contract territory.  We  focus  on  two  potential anti-competitive effects 
arising from the combination of selectivity and exclusivity.  Both effects concern a reduction 
of intrabrand competition, i.e.  competition between dealers selling the same brand. 
International intrabrand competition and price discrimination 
When selectivity and exclusivity are combined, cross-border arbitrage possibilities are lim-
ited.  The rights of end-consumers to purchase cars abroad are in principle protected.  But 
selectivity prevents independent resellers to systematically engage in  arbitrage,  while  ex-
clusivity prevents  the authorized dealers to set up foreign  branches to take advantage of 
price differentials.  The result  is  a  lack of international intrabrand competition, enabling 
the manufacturers to engage in international price discrimination.  The lack of international 
intrabrand competition has been documented extensively.  For example, BEUC (1992)  and 
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) report evidence of very limited parallel imports (in the range 
of 0-2% of total sales), despite the large international price differentials. 
National intrabrand competition and tacit collusion 
Selectivity and exclusivity have  an additional  potential effect  on  intrabrand competition 
within a country.  As  analyzed by Rey and Stiglitz (1995),  a limited degree of intrabrand 
competition creates a double  marginalization effect,  which serves  to reduce the degree of 
5 competition between the manufacturers.4  As  a result, equilibrium prices will  increase and 
profits may be higher than under non-cooperative Bertrand pricing, a form of tacit collusion 
between manufacturers.  In practice, it is not clear whether the distribution system effectively 
succeeds in limiting intrabrand competition also at the national level.  For example, the U.K. 
Competition Commission  quotes the number of 39%  as  the proportion of out-of-territory 
sales  (within a country). It interprets this as  a small number because of the high degree of 
urbanization and commuting.  The industry, in contrast, would interpret this number as an 
indication that intrabrand competition within a country is  high. 
The 2002 proposals for  liberalization 
The Commission's proposed liberalization consists of essentially a more flexible system, where 
manufacturers may choose to adopt either selectivity or exclusivity, but no longer the com-
bination of both.  This has the following  possible effects.  First, it stimulates international 
intrabrand competition, either by independent resellers  (if exclusivity is  chosen)  or by the 
foreign branches of authorized dealers (if selectivity is chosen).  This reduces the feasibility 
of international price discrimination. Second, it stimulates national intrabrand competition, 
at least to the extent that this was effectively limited under the existing system.  This would 
have the effect of eliminating the tacit collusion device. 
2.2  Overview of the model 
To assess the economic effects of the liberalization, we take into account the above critical 
features of selectivity and exclusivity to specify a model of demand and oligopoly pricing. 
Based on a set of assumptions and the available statistical information (including market 
shares and prices), the model forms the basis for measuring market power before liberaliza-
tion, as well as predicting market power afterwards. 
The first  step specifies  the demand for  new cars.  In the spirit of some  recent merger 
studies this step may be viewed as a complement (or a substitute?) of the more traditional 
market definition analysis.  Consistent with the previous discussion on the combined effect of 
selectivity and exclusivity, the demand model assumes there is  no international intrabrand 
competition, i.e.  no cross-border trade, and then specifies the substitution patterns within 
the geographically segmented markets. 
The second step models oligopoly  pricing before  the liberalization of the distribution 
system.  In contrast to the previous literature on oligopoly pricing in the car market, we 
4Rey and Stiglitz' analysis mentions territorial exclusivity as a mechanism to eliminate  (or reduce)  in-
trabrand competition.  Yet  selectivity works  as  a  complementary device,  since  it eliminates  the role  of 
independent resellers in intrabrand competition. 
6 explicitly account for the role of intrabrand competition.  The above discussion showed that 
the current system limits international intrabrand competition, but it is  not so  obvious to 
which extent the system effectively limits national intrabrand competition.  We respond to 
this  choice  problem by considering  two  alternative benchmark scenarios  of pricing under 
the distribution system before liberalization.  In the first  scenario there is no  international 
intrabrand competition (as already reflected in the demand specification), but there is  full 
national intrabrand competition.  In the second scenario,  there is  again  no  international 
intraj:Jrand competition, and there is also limited national intrabrand competition. 
The final step models oligopoly pricing after liberalization.  Two effects may arise.  First, 
the removal of either selectivity or  exclusivity increases  international intrabrand competi-
tion,  due to cross-border trade activities  by either independent resellers  (if  selectivity is 
abandoned) or by foreign  branches by the authorized dealers (if exclusivity is  abandoned). 
Second, there may be an increase in national intrabrand competition, at least to the extent 
that this was limited under the existing system (second scenario).  To account for  these ef-
fects, we model oligopoly pricing after liberalization as full national intrabrand competition, 
subject to the constraints on international price discrimination. 
3  The model 
3.1  Demand 
There are M  national markets; in each market m there are Lm potential consumers.  A con-
sumer i located in market m can choose among the J differentiated products.  Assume that 
cross-border arbitrage costs are prohibitive so that consumers do not consider to purchase a 
car in another market than where they are located.  This assumption allows  us to suppress 
the market subscript m for now;  we will, however, need to explicitly reintroduce it below.  A 
consumer i's conditional indirect utility from product j  = 1, ... , J is  given by: 
x~f3 - apj +  ~j +  Cij 
6j  +  Cij, 
(1 ) 
where 6j  is the mean utility, which  is common to all consumers, and Cij is  the (mean zero) 
individual-specific utility term.  The mean utility 6j  depends on Xj, a K-dimensional vector 
of product characteristics, on Pj, the price of product j, and on ~j' an unobserved product 
valuation.  The observed product characteristics in  Xj  are horsepower,  fuel  efficiency,  size 
of the car,  etc...  The unobserved  (to the econometrician)  product characteristic  ~j may 
7 include style, image, advertizing, etc.  Consumers may decide not to purchase any product. 
In this case they choose the outside good for  which the mean part of the indirect utility 00 
is  normalized to 0,  so that UiO  =  CiO. 
To model the distribution of the individual-specific utility term Cij we follow the assump-
tions of a two-level nested logit model.  Assume the national market can be partitioned into 
G different groups.  Each group 9 can be further partitioned in Hg subgroups.  Each subgroup 
h contains Ag products, L:~=1  L:~;:'1 Jhg  = J.  According to the distributional assumptions 
of the nested logit  model  consumers may have  correlated preferences  across  all  products 
of the same subgroup, and (no  stronger)  correlated preferences across  all products of the 
same group but a different subgroup.  The interpretation is that products belonging to the 
same subgroup or group share a common set of features, and that consumers have correlated 
preferences over these features.  In  the car market,  marketing classifications and previous 
studies by e.g.  Goldberg (1995)  and Goldberg and Verboven  (1996)  partition the national 
markets into five  groups according to "market segment", or "class":  subcompact, compact, 
intermediate, standard and luxury.  A sixth group is added and reserved exclusively for the 
outside good.  The idea is  that cars from the same market segment share a common set of 
features such as size and prestige, often as the result of deliberate marketing efforts.  Each 
of the five  main market segments is  further subdivided in two subgroups according to the 
country of origin:  domestic or foreign.  Cars from the same country of origin (domestic or 
foreign) share additional common features, e.g.  the image or style.  Since the domestic firms 
typically have a  substantially more dense dealer network than the foreign  firms,  an addi-
tional common feature of cars from same origin is the average dealer distance for  obtaining 
after-sales services. 
If consumers choose one unit of the product that maximizes utility,  the distributional 
assumptions of the nested logit model yield the following choice probability or market share 
for  each product j, as a function of the J  x 1 price vector p: 
s .(p) =  exp(Oj/(l - O"hg))  exp(Ihg/(l - O"g)) exp(Ig) 
J  exp(Ihg/(l- O"hg))  exp(lg/(l- O"g))  exp(I) 
(2) 
where h g, Ig,  and I, are "inclusive values", defined by: 
8 Jhg 
h g  (1  - iYhg) In:L  exp(oj/(l - iYhg))  (3) 
j=l 
Hg 
19  (1  - iYg) In:L exp(Ihg/(l- iYg)) 
h=l 
G 
I  In :Lexp(Ig) 
g=l 
The parameters iYhg  and  0"  9  are the nested logit  random coefficients associated to the 
subgroups h of 9 and the groups g.  They measure the degree of correlation of consumer pref-
erences for cars belonging to the same subgroups or groups.  The conditions on McFadden's 
(1978)  GEV model imply that the model is consistent with random utility maximization if 
1 2:  iYhg  2:  iYg  2:  O.  In a typical case where 1 > iYhg  > iYg  > 0, consumer preferences are more 
strongly correlated across products of the same subgroup than across products of a different 
subgroup within the same group; preferences are in turn more correlated across these prod-
ucts than across products from a different group.  As  iYhg goes to 1,  preferences for  products 
of the same subgroup become perfectly correlated, so these products are perceived as perfect 
substitutes. If  all iYhg go to 0"  g, preferences become equally correlated for all products of the 
same group.  The model then reduces to a one-level nested logit  model, where the groups 
constitute the nests.  Similarly, if all iYg  go  to 0,  preferences for  products of the same group 
9 but a different subgroup become uncorrelated and the model again reduces to a one-level 
nested logit, where the subgroups now constitute the nests.  Finally, as all  iYhg  and O"g  go to 
o  preferences for all products become uncorrelated, and the model reduces to a simple logit 
model. 
At the aggregate demand level, the parameters iYhg  and iY 9  allow us to assess to which 
extent competition is  localized between products from  the same subgroup or group.  Note 
that our specification is more flexible than previous nested logit specifications estimated for 
the car market. We allow the heterogeneity parameters to differ for different subgroups and 
groups.  Hence,  it is  possible to assess whether the preferences are more correlated across 
products from certain (sub)groups than others. 
The nested logit model can be interpreted as  a special case of the random coefficients 
models estimated by Berry,  Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),  Nevo  (2001),  Petrin (2002)  and 
others.  Its main advantage is its econometric tractability, but it is potentially restrictive; see 
Berry (1994) and Berry and Pakes (2001) for a careful economic discussion.  A first restriction 
is  that the nested logit  random coefficients  only refer  to discretely  measured features  or 
9 dummy variables  ("style",  "prestige"), and not to continuously measured features, such as 
performance or  size.  Note  that these dummy variables  are potentially important in  the 
case of cars.  They may also  at least  partially proxy  for  the omitted continuous features 
("size"), especially since we  allow  the random coefficients to differ  by subgroup and group 
in contrast to previous empirical work.  A second and potentially more important restriction 
relates to the specific distributional assumptions that are imposed on the nested logit random 
coefficients.  These may in principle be relaxed by considering other versions of McFadden's 
(1978) GEV model.  Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) propose and estimate a GEV 
model with overlapping groups, but Goldberg and Verb oven (2001)  do not find support for 
this model for the car market.  Small (1987) proposes an ordered logit model; a worthwhile 
extension would be a model in which the groups rather than the products are ordered, so that 
cars from the neighboring segments  (e.g.  subcompact and compact) are closer substitutes 
than cars from more distant segments. 
3.2  Oligopoly pricing before liberalization 
To measure the marginal costs for  each product j, we  now specify oligopoly pricing before 
liberalization.  As  already reflected  in the demand specification,  there is  no  international 
intrabrand competition (no cross-border trade) because of the combined impact of selectivity 
and exclusivity.  National intrabrand competition,  however,  mayor may not be present, 
depending on whether the vertical restraints have bite within a country. To incorporate the 
extent of national intrabrand competition,  we  explicitly model  the manufacturer-retailer 
relationship. 
There are F  multi-product manufacturing firms.  Each firm f  sells a subset Ff  of the J 
products. These subsets Ff  are mutually exclusive, so each product is sold by only one firm. 
Each firm sells its products through a  retailer, rather than directly to consumers.  There 
are R retailers, each retailer r  sells  a subset R,.  of the products.  There are two stages.  In 
the first stage each manufacturing firm f  simultaneously chooses the wholesale price Wj  for 
every product JEFf. In the second stage, each retailer r  simultaneously chooses the retail 
price Pj  for  every product j  E R,.,  given the wholesale prices charged by the firms in first 
stage.  The equilibrium is solved by backward induction. 
In  the second stage,  each retailer  r  simultaneously chooses  its prices  and obtains the 
following profits as a function of the J  x 1 price vector p: 
IIr(P) = L (Pj  - Wj) sj(P)L 
jER.-
10 
(4) Note that we have normalized the retailer's marginal cost of selling to zero (see more below). 
We do not yet specify actual retail pricing behavior in the second stage here.  At a general 
level, the J x 1 second-stage equilibrium retail price vector p depends on the J x 1 first-stage 
wholesale price vector w, i.e. 
p =  p(w)  (5) 
where p(.)  is  a J  x  1 vector of functions, and a typical function Pj(-)  describes product j's 
retail price as  a function of the wholesale price vector w.  Let 'V wp( w)  ==  8p( w) / aw' be the 
J  x  J  Jacobian matrix of first  derivatives.  A typical element (j, k)  of this matrix contains 
the effect  of an increase in the wholesale price Wk  on  the retail price Pj'  In  other words, 
'V wp( w)  is the matrix of pass-through rates. 
In  the first  stage,  each manufacturer f  simultaneously chooses  its wholesale  prices to 
maximize its own profits, taking into account the retailers' pricing responses in the second 
stage through the pass-through function p(.).  Each manufacturer f  obtains the following 
profits as a function of the wholesale price vector w: 
IIf(w) =  L  (Wj  -mcj)sj(p(w))L  (6) 
JEFf 
where mCj  is  the marginal cost of product j.  Since the retailer's marginal cost has been 
normalized to zero, mCj ought to be interpreted as including both the manufacturer's and the 
retailer's marginal cost.  The profit-maximizing wholesale price of each product j  =  1, . .. , J 
should then satisfy the following first-order condition: 
.(  ())  ~  (  _  ) (8Sk(P) 8pl(W)  8sdp) 8PJ(W))  _ 0  sJ  p w  + ~  Wk  mCk  8  a  + ... +  a  8  - . 
kEFf  PI  Wj  PJ  Wj 
A unit increase in product j's wholesale price Wj  has two effects.  First, it raises the manu-
facturer's margin so that the profits raise proportional to product j's market share.  Second, 
it induces positive price responses by the retailers, which indirectly reduces sales. 
To write this  system of  J  first-order  conditions in  vector  notation,  define  the J  x  J 
matrix OF  as  the manufacturing firm's  product ownership  matrix with a  typical element 
OF (j, k)  equal to 1 if products j  and k are produced by the same firm,  and 0 otherwise.  Let 
s(p)  be the J  x 1 market share vector, and 'Vps(p)  == as(p)/8p' be the corresponding J  x J 
Jacobian matrix of first  derivatives.  Let me be the J  x  1 marginal cost vector.  Finally, 
11 use the operator. to denote element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of the same 
dimension.  We have: 
s(p(w)) + (OF. ['i7ps(p)'i7wp(w)]') (w - me) = 0 .  (7) 
The solution (ji, w) to the second stage system (5)  and the first stage system (7)  consti-
tutes the subgame perfect equilibrium, which we assume to exist.  Inverting the system (7) 
at this solution, we obtain the following solution for the marginal cost vector: 
(8) 
To complete the specification,  it is  necessary to become more explicit about the nature of 
retail pricing in the second stage, as  given by (5),  with the corresponding matrix of pass-
through rates 'i7 wp( w). 
Full national intrabrand competition 
This scenario assumes that the current distribution system cannot successfully limit national 
intrabrand competition.  Retailers compete vigorously in the second stage,  driving down 
retail prices to wholesale prices.  Such full intrabrand competition may be easily modelled by 
defining the retailers' product subsets R,.  in (4)  as mutually nonexclusive, such that every 
product j  is  owned by at least two  retailers r  and r'o  Oligopoly pricing then effectively 
reduces  to a  traditional model of pricing for  the car market,  as  in  Berry,  Levinsohn  and 
Pakes (1995). 
When at least two retailers compete for the same product j, the retail price equilibrium 
(5)  is simply given by p = w,  and the pass-through matrix 'i7wp(w)  reduces to the identity 
matrix h  (Le.  an increase in the wholesale price of product j  leads to the same increase in 
the retail price of product j  and leaves the retail prices of the other products unaffected). 
At the equilibrium solution (]i, w), the marginal cost vector (8)  simplifies to: 
me  p+ (OF. ['i7ps(p)]'r1 s(ji) 
-F  me 
As in previous work, the marginal cost vector is then simply measured by the observed equi-
librium price vector p minus the estimated wholesale margin vector - (OF. ['i7ps(ji)]') -1 s(ji). 
Limited national intrabrand competition 
12 This scenario assumes that distribution system can effectively eliminate or reduce national 
intrabrand competition. The absence of national intrabrand competition can be modelled by 
defining the retailers' product subsets R,. in (4) as mutually exclusive.  Oligopoly pricing then 
generalizes Rey and Stiglitz' (1995) model in which two  manufacturers sell to one retailer 
who does not compete with other retailers of the same brand. 
When each retailer, as the exclusive owner of all products in its product set R,.,  chooses 
its  retail prices  to maximize its own  retail profit  (4),  the following  first-order  conditions 
should be satisfied for each product j = 1, ... , J: 
To write this system of J first-order conditions in vector notation, define the J x J matrix 
(JR  as the retailer's product ownership matrix with a typical element (JR(j,k)  equal to 1 if 
products j  and k are sold by the same retailer, and equal to 0 otherwise.  We have: 
(9) 
We can invert this system to obtain: 
(10) 
Suppose the system f (p, w) = 0 meets the conditions of the implicit function theorem, i.e. 
every fiO is  continuously differentiable with respect to every Pj and wi>  and the Jacobian 
matrix '\1 pf  (p, w)  evaluated at the equilibrium solution  (p, w)  is  non-singular.  Then the 
system f(P, w) = 0 implicitly defines the functions p(.) of the second-stage Nash equilibrium 
retail price vector at the equilibrium solution (p, w).  Furthermore, the matrix of pass-through 
rates '\1 wp(w) evaluated at (p, w) is given by: 
- ['\1 pf(P, w)r1 '\1 wf(P, w) 
['\1pf(P,w)r1 . 
(11) 
where the second equality follows  from the fact that '\1 wf  (P, w)  equals minus the identity 
matrix.s 
5In the numerical analysis, we  originally computed 'Vwp(p)  directly from (9)  rather than from  f{P,w). 
But the procedure to first inverting the system and then setting 'V pf  (p, 'iii)  equal to the identity matrix 
proved a useful simplification in the numerical analysis. 
13 Rearranging (10), we can write the (to us) unobserved equilibrium wholesale price vector 
as a function of the observed equilibrium retail price vector: 
(12) 
i.e.  the wholesale price vector equals the retail price vector minus the retail margin vector 
- (OR. 'VpS(p))/-1 s(p).  After substituting out (11)  and (12)  , the marginal cost vector (8) 
becomes: 
me  p + (OR.  ['Vps(p)]'r1  s(p) + (OF.  ['Vps(p)  ('Vpf(p, w)-1)]'r1  s(p) 
-N  me  . 
Intuitively,  the marginal cost  vector can be measured  by the observed equilibrium  retail 
price vector minus the estimated retail margin vector  - (OR. ['Vps(p)]') -1 s(p)  minus the 
estimated wholesale margin vector - (OF.  ['Vps(P) ('Vp/(p,W)-I)],)-1 s(P). 
To summarize, we measure the marginal cost vector for all products j, based on two al-
ternative scenarios of retail pricing before liberalization.  In the first scenario, there is full na-
tional intrabrand competition, so that retail margins are zero.  In the second scenario, there is 
no intrabrand competition so that the retail margin vector is given by - (OR. 'V  pB (p)) 1-1 B (p) 
in (12).  In practice, we  have outside information (from the European Commission) on the 
average percentage retail margin ~f=1  (pj  - Wj) / J in the various countries.  These numbers 
are greater than zero but lower than the average as calculated using  (12),  suggesting that 
a situation of "limited" intrabrand competition is  the more realistic scenario.  We  consider 
such a situation by modifying (12)  to: 
(13) 
where the parameter A is  chosen  such that the average  percentage  retail margin in  (13) 
equals the average obtained from our outside source.  We correspondingly modify 'V wp(w) 
to compute the marginal cost vector. 
3.3  Oligopoly pricing after liberalization 
The liberalization of the distribution system has two main effects.  First, it creates national 
intrabrand competition, at least to the extent that this did not already exist before liber-
alization.  Second, it creates international intrabrand competition, which may be modelled 
14 in different ways.  A  first  approach directly introduces cross-border arbitrage costs in the 
consumers' indirect utility.  The creation of international competition then amounts to a 
reduction in the consumers' arbitrage costs  (from the initially prohibitive levels).  We  do 
not follow this approach since the liberalization does not directly affect consumers' obsta-
cles to trade;  final  consumers in fact  already have unrestricted trade opportunities before 
liberalization and they simply do not seem to take advantage of them. 
A second approach to modelling international intrabrand competition extends the model 
of oligopoly pricing by including constraints on international price or markup differentials. 
We  follow  this approach since it has the direct interpretation of capturing arbitrage inter-
ventions by either the independent resellers or the authorized dealers' foreign branches.  The 
most straightforward way would be to introduce a constraint on international price differen-
tials, the interpretation being that arbitrage intervention will take place whenever the price 
differentials exceed cross-border trade costs, such as transportation, administration and de-
lay costs.  In practice, however,  it is  important to account for  the fact  that the products 
for  which prices are measured are not completely identical across countries.  They may dif-
fer  across countries because of specification differences, such as horsepower, better optional 
equipment, the right-hand drive  regulation in the U.K., etc  ...  Arbitrage intervention will 
therefore only take place when  the price differentials exceed  the cross-border trade costs 
after adjusting for  any differences in the marginal costs.  Put differently, it is appropriate to 
introduce the constraints on international markup differentials rather than on international 
price differentials.6 
We can now specify oligopoly pricing with constraints on international markup differen-
tials.  To simplify, we assume there is full national intrabrand competition after liberalization, 
so that wholesale and retail prices coincide,  i.e.  w = p.  It is  necessary to reintroduce our 
subscript notation:  there are M  national markets, m  =  1, ... , M.  Both cost and demand 
conditions are independent of the prices  in the other markets.  Marginal cost  is  indepen-
dent of foreign  prices because there are constant marginal costs.  Demand is  independent 
of price because consumers' arbitrage costs are prohibitive, so  the Lm consumers in market 
m effectively base their choices only on the models available in market m. Interdependence 
between  markets  stems from  the inequality  constraint that for  each  product j  and each 
pair of countries m  and n the markup differential should be less than a  percentage 'T,  i.e. 
6 A case may be made to consider constraint on  price differentials so  as to capture the effects  of_ direct 
regulation,  e.g.  the up to now  never  enforced  rule that price differentials  should not exceed  12%  on a 
permanent basis.  See  Davidson,  Dewatripont,  Ginsburgh,  and Labbe  (1989)  for  a  theoretical analysis in 
a duopoly setting.  There approach is  consistent with ours since they assume that the marginal costs are 
identical across countries. 
15 Pjm - mcjm :<:::  (1 +  T) (pjn - mcjn), where mcjm is the marginal cost of product j  in market m 
as computed from solving the equilibrium before liberalization (Le.  it refers to either mcfm 
or mcfm).  The parameter T  can take alternative values and is our measure of the extent of 
international intrabrand competition after liberalization.  Each firm f  maximizes its total 
profits across  all  markets, subject to a set of inequality constraints on the prices of every 
product j  and every pair of countries m and n: 
M 
IIjm(Pm) = L L  (Pjm - mcjm) Sjm(Pm)Lm 
m=ljEF!m 
subject to  (1 +  T)(Pjn - mcjn) - (Pjm  - mcjm) 2  0 
j  = 1, ... ,J,  m, n = 1, ... ,M. 
(14) 
Define Lagrange multipliers )..jmn  associated with the constraints of each product j  and 
each pair bf countries m  and n.  The constrained profit-maximizing prices of product j  in 
markets m = 1, ... ,M should satisfy the following Kuhn-TUcker conditions: 
(1 + r)(Pjn - mcjn) - (Pjm - mcjm)  2  0,  )..jmn  20, 
)..jmn ((1 + r)(Pjn - mcjn) - (Pjm  - mcjm))  0, 
m,n= 1, ... ,M. 
The first-order conditions with respect to prices (in the first row of (15)) generalize our 
previous unconstrained first-order  conditions  (now with a  subscript m), extended with a 
set of nonnegative Lagrange multipliers.  The complementary slackness conditions (in  the 
second and third row) state that for  each pair of countries m  and n the constraint is either 
binding ("active"), or nonbinding in which case )..jmn = O.  Although there are many country 
pair combinations,  several  constraints  can be eliminated.  The constraints  are obviously 
nonbinding for m  =  n, so that )..jmm =  0 for  all m.  The constraints of country pair (m, n) 
and (n, m) are mutually exclusive, so least )..jmn = 0 or  )..jnm = O.  Similarly, if the constraint 
of country pair (m, n) and (m, n') are both binding, then Pjn = Pjn'  so that the constraints 
of both country pairs  (n, n')  and  (n', n)  must be nonbinding,  so  )..jnn'  =  )..jn'n  =  O.  By 
eliminating these possibilities, one can easily verify that product j  has at most M - 1 active 
constraints, hence )..jmn > 0 for at most M  - 1 country pairs. 
16 A  Nash equilibrium is  a JM x  1 price vector p* such that the Kuhn-TUcker conditions 
(15)  are satisfied for all products j. To compute a candidate Nash equilibrium we proceed as 
follows.  For each product j, we impose a set of K j  :':::  M -1 active constraints (such that none 
of them are mutually exclusive or inconsistent otherwise).  In addition, for each product j  we 
impose the M  first-order conditions with respect to prices, setting the Lagrange multipliers 
of the nonactive constraints equal to zero.  We  simplify these M  first-order conditions to a 
reduced system of M  - K j  equations by substituting out the K j  nonzero  Ajmn.  For each 
product j, we  thus impose K j  active constraints and M  - K j  other equations as  obtained 
from the first-order conditions.  The candidate Nash equilibrium is the solution to this system 
of equations over all products j. The Appendix works out an example of such a system of 
equations, in which only the constraint of one product j  for one country pair (1,2) is binding 
(so  K j  = 1 for  product j  and Kj  = 0 otherwise). 
Once the solution of a  candidate Nash equilibrium is  obtained,  we  check whether all 
the Kuhn-TUcker conditions are satisfied, in particular whether (i)  no  active constraint is 
unjustified, i.e.  Ajmn  2:  0 for  all j, m, n, and whether (ii)  no inactive constraint is violated. 
If all the conditions are satisfied, we  use the solution as our constrained Nash equilibrium. 
If not, then we  consider a new candidate Nash equilibrium, by relaxing one or more of the 
active constraints and/or imposing one or more new constraints, until a solution is found 
that satisfies all  the Kuhn-TUcker conditions.  This is  a process of trial and error, common 
in constrained optimization problems.  In practice,  we  proceed  as  follows.  We  begin by 
imposing all the constraints that are violated under the old equilibrium, and compute the 
candidate Nash equilibrium. We then check whether new constraints need to be imposed and 
whether some constraints need to be relaxed, and, if so, we  compute a new candidate Nash 
equilibrium.  We  usually need about 5 to 10 trials before we obtain a solution that satisfies 
all  the Kuhn-TUcker conditions.  Note that, if we  set T  = 0,  the problem is simplified.  In 
this case, the problem reduces to a simple constrained maximization problem with equality 
constraints only, i.e.  (Pjn - fflcjn) - (Pjm  - fflcjm) = 0 for  all j, m and n. 
3.4  Welfare 
To compare the computed equilibrium prices p' after liberalization with the observed equi-
librium prices p before liberalization, we compute the changes in the various welfare com-
ponents, in particular consumer surplus and producer surplus.  Define consumer surplus as 
the expected value of the maximum of the utilities (1).  Using the nested logit distributional 
assumptions, the change in consumer surplus in market m  is  equal to: 
17 where I  is the inclusive value defined by (3), now written as  a function of the price vectors 
before or after liberalization.  For comparison purposes, we  also compute the changes in the 
price indices,  using either the pre-liberalization or the post-liberalization market shares as 
weights.  The change in industry profits is simply given by 
F  F 
I::.PSm = L IIJm(p;")  - L IIJm(Pm)· 
J=1  J=1 
The exogenous variables  are assumed not to change after liberalization.  In particular, 
the exogenous part of utility in (1), i.e.  xj/3 +  f.j ,  and marginal cost, mcj remain unchanged 
for all products j. Our focus  is  thus entirely on a quantification of the allocative effects of 
liberalizing the distribution system.  A more complete analysis would also incorporate the 
efficiency effects, which may enter through changes utility, marginal costs or fixed costs. 
4  Data and estimation 
4.1  The data 
The data set consists of prices, sales and physical characteristics of (essentially) all cars sold 
in  five  European markets during 1970-1999.  The included countries are Belgium,  France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.  Since approximately 80  models are sold in every 
market/year, the total number of observations is about 12,000.  The price data are pre-tax 
and post-tax list prices corresponding to the base model available in the market, as available 
in consumer  catalogues.  Sales  are new  car registrations  for  the model  range.  Physical 
characteristics (also from consumer catalogues) include dimensions  (weight, length, width, 
height), engine characteristics (horsepower, displacement) and performance measures (speed, 
acceleration and fuel efficiency).  The data set also includes variables to identify the model, 
the brand,  the firm,  the country of origin/production location,  and the market segment 
("class").  The data set is  augmented with macro-economic variables including population, 
exchange rates, GDP and consumer price indices for  the various markets over the relevant 
period.  Finally,  there is  information on  dealer  discounts  and gross  dealer margins for  a 
selected  number  of models/years.  A  more  detailed  description  of the data set  and the 
sources, for  the shorter period of 1980-1993, is  provided in Goldberg and Verb oven (2001). 
18 4.2  Demand estimation and identification 
We  estimate the nested logit demand system (2), where the mean valuation bj  is  given by 
(1).  The unobserved part of the mean valuation,  ~j' is the error term and enters nonlinearly 
in (2).  Following Berry's (1994)  nested logit example, we transform the demand system to 
obtain a  linear expression for  ~j; see Verboven  (1996)  for  details on the derivation for  the 
two-level nested logit.  Adding a market subscript m and a time subscript t, the estimating 
demand equation takes the following form: 
where Sj/hgmt is the market share of product j  in its subgroup h of g, and Sh/gmt is the market 
share of all products of subgroup h in group g.  The price coefficient a  is interacted with the 
inverse of income, Ymt.7  The product fixed  effects  ~j control for  unobserved mean product 
valuations that do  not vary over  time or  across markets,  e.g.  style  or image.  Similarly, 
the full  set of market/time fixed  effects  ~mt captures preferences  for  cars relative to the 
outside good,  and can thus be thought of  as accounting for  macro-economic fluctuations 
that affect  the decision to purchase a  new  car.  Finally,  the error term  ~jmt captures the 
remaining unobserved product valuations varying across  products, markets and time,  e.g. 
due to unobserved variations in advertizing, delivery times, etc. 
To estimate the model, the main identification assumption is that the product character-
istics entering Xjmt  are predetermined and thus uncorrelated with the error term ~jmt.  The 
price Pjmt and the market shares In(sj/hgmt) and In(sh/gmt) may however be correlated with 
the error term. This follows from the fact that the manufacturers may take into account all 
the relevant demand factors when setting their prices, including the (to the econometrician) 
unobserved error terms.  Ordinary least squares will therefore produce biased estimates and 
instrumental variables should be used;  in our application, we  use  a fixed  effects  two-stage 
least squares estimator.  Supply side variables  are the obvious candidates for  instruments 
in addition to Xjmt.  Cost shifters are however not readily available at the detailed product 
level.  Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)  and much of the subsequent literature, 
we instead use markup shifters as additional instruments. 
Their starting point is  that firm 1's pricing policy for  product j  does not only depend 
7Nevo  (2001)  also interacts a  with income (allowing a  to vary across individuals).  He interacts a  with 
income and income squared, whereas we interact it with the inverse of income.  If price is small relative to 
(capitalized) income, our specification in fact also approximates the familiar Cobb Douglass specification in 
which price enters through the term a In(y - Pj). 
19 on product j's own characteristics Xjmt.  Because of oligopolistic interdependence, it also de-
pends on the characteristics of the other products owned by firm f and on the characteristics 
of the competing products (measuring their closeness in the product space).  Berry, Levin-
sohn and Pakes propose to use functions of the competitors' characteristics as instruments, 
and discuss the general problem of how to choose approximately efficient instruments.  In 
the spirit of their results, we  adopted the following  list of instruments, making use of the 
specific structure of the nested logit model:  (i)  the products' own  observed characteristics 
Xjmt;  (ii)  the number of products, and the sums of characteristics of other products of the 
same firm belonging to the same subgroup, interacted with a subgroup dummy variable; (iii) 
the number of products, and the sums of the characteristics of competing products belong-
ing to the same subgroup, interacted with a subgroup dummy variable;  (iv) the number of 
products, and the sums of the characteristics of competing products belonging to the same 
group, interacted with a group dummy variable.  Note that we  interact the "oligopolistic 
interdependence" instruments in (ii)-(iv) with subgroup or group dummy variables, since we 
allow the differentiation parameters IJ"hg  and IJ" 9 to differ across subgroups and groups. 
4.3  Demand estimates 
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.  For comparison purposes, the first column 
presents the results from a restricted specification in which IJ"hg  is equal for all ten subgroups 
and IJ" 9  is equal across all five groups.  This is the commonly estimated version of the nested 
logit model.  The second column presents the results of a more flexible specification, in which 
the subgroup segmentation parameters are allowed to vary by segment.  To check for  the 
sensitivity of the results, we also considered various alternative specifications.  For example, 
we estimated a restricted specification in which  ~mt =  ~m +  ~t. We also allowed some of the 
parameters to vary across countries, and we estimated the model for two separate subperiods: 
1970-1984 and 1985-1999.  Most parameter estimates were robust across specifications. 
Both specifications in Table 2 show that the parameters of the included characteristics 
are of the expected sign and significant.  Horsepower, width and height positively affect the 
consumers' mean valuation, whereas fuel inefficiency (measured as liters per 100 km)  has a 
negative impact. Similarly, price has a significantly negative effect.  The joint significance of 
the fixed effects  ~j and ~mt could not be rejected at a very high significance level  (P-value 
less than .0001). 
The foreign firm effect is negative and significant, so the domestic incumbents face a com-
petitive advantage over their foreign  competitors in terms of the mean consumer valuation 
(e.g.  Peugeot/Citroen and Renault in France; Volkswagen, etc.  in Germany; Fiat in Italy). 
20 We  also  considered two  specifications to look whether the foreign  firm  effect  has changed 
over  time.  A first specification added a foreign firm  effect  interacted with a  dummy vari-
able for  the post-1984 period;  as second specification added a foreign  firm effect interacted 
with a time trend.  Both specifications show that the importance of the foreign  firm effect 
has declined substantially, by some 40%  over a fifteen year period.  This indicates that the 
competitive advantage of the domestic incumbents is declining, probably due to the process 
of European integration (as most foreign firms are E.D. firms,  or have production facilities 
in th!}  E.D.). 
Now consider the segmentation parameters 0".  For both the restricted and the unrestricted 
specification the restrictions implied by the random utility maximization assumption are 
satisfied for  all  parameters, i.e.  1  2:  O"hg  2:  O"g  2:  O.  The restricted specification shows that 
consumer preferences are significantly more correlated for  cars within the same subgroup 
(parameter of.  706), than for cars within the same group but a different subgroup (parameter 
of .502).  Put differently, consumers have more homogeneous valuations regarding cars that 
come from both the same origin (domestic or foreign)  and the same segment than regarding 
cars that only come from the same segment.  Furthermore, preferences are more correlated 
for  cars of the same segment than for  cars of different segments (since  .502 is significantly 
different from 0).  These results are roughly in line with previous estimates for the European 
car market, in particular by Goldberg and Verb oven (2001). 
The flexible  specification  allows  the segmentation parameters  O"hg  and  0"  9  to vary by 
subgroup and group.  To reduce the number of segmentation parameters to be estimated, we 
constrained O"Dg = O"Fg  (where  D  denotes domestic and F  denotes foreign), i.e.  the degree 
of heterogeneity within a domestic subgroup is the same that within a foreign subgroup of a 
given group g.  This specification reveals several interesting new insights.  Consider first the 
parameters for  the subgroups  (O"hg) ,  defined by cars of both the same origin and segment. 
The estimates show that consumers are typically more homogeneous  regarding cars from 
the smaller segments than regarding cars from  the larger ones.  For  example,  preference 
correlation is  .849  for  domestic  subcompact cars,  and only .461  for  domestic luxury cars. 
This finding  appears consistent  with our a priori guess  that the degree of differentiation 
increases  as  one  moves  up to the more expensive segments.  The only exception to this 
pattern is  the standard segment, for  which the segmentation parameter is close to that of 
the subcompact segment. 
Considering the parameters from the groups (0" g), one can see that O"hg > 0" 9  in all cases: 
consumers thus perceive cars from the same origin as  significantly closer substitutes than 
cars from a different origin.  Put differently, for each segment we find  significant additional 
segmentation between domestic  and foreign  cars.  Note that the group segmentation pa-
21 rameters also suggest that the degree of heterogeneity increases as one moves to the more 
expensive segments (compare e.g.  the estimate of .410  for  the subcompact versus  .171  for 
the luxury), but the pattern is weaker than for  the subgroup segmentation parameters. 
Table 2.  Parameter estimates for the nested logit demand' 
I  restricted  I  flexible 
Mean valuation parameters 
constant  -8.760  (.554)  -8.059 
horsepower  .Oll  (.002)  .006 
fuel  inefficiency  -.052  (.007)  -.043 
width  .029  (.002)  .025 
height  .013  (.003)  .0lD 
foreign  -.784  (.038)  -.777 
- price (0:)  2.281  (.204)  1.783 
Subgroup  segmentation parameters  (CYhg) 


























subcompact  .502  (.022)  .410  (.029) 
compact  same  .572  (.032) 
intermediate  same  .440  (.034) 
standard  same  .540  (.028) 
luxury  same  .171  (.048) 
,  The number of observations is  12077.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Fixed effects 
~j and ~mt are included. 
It is instructive to look at the substitution patterns implied by the demand estimates, and 
see how  they differ  between the restricted and the unrestricted nested logit specifications. 
Table 3 provides a summary, presenting the average own- and cross-price elasticities.  The 
average elasticities for the whole market are in line with previous work, for example Goldberg 
and Verboven's  (2001)  findings.  Interesting new findings  arise when comparing the price 
elasticities for the different segments between the restricted and the restricted specification. 
The restricted specification shows that the own-elasticities are increasing as  one  moves  to 
22 higher segments.  The average elasticity in the luxury segment is  more than three times 
the average elasticity in the subcompact segment.  The increasing pattern follows  from the 
near proportional relationship between the price elasticities and the price level as implied by 
the restricted nested logit:  the average price level in the luxury segment is  also more than 
three times higher than the average price level in the subcompact segment.  To put this in 
a different way,  in the restricted nested logit the semi-elasticities (elasticities divided by the 
price) do not show systematic variation across different segments.  The flexible nested logit 
shows that the own-price elasticities no longer move proportionally to price as one moves 
up to the more expensive segments.  For  example, the average own-price elasticity in  the 
subcompact and the luxury segment are more or less the same (4.7).  As a result, the semi-
elasticities tend to be lower for the more expensive models (the exception being the standard 
segment). The reason for these differences with the restricted nested logit is our earlier finding 
that consumers perceive products in the inexpensive segments as closer substitutes to each 
other than products in the more  expensive  segments.  Note that similar remarks can be 
made regarding the pattern of cross-price elasticities across different segments.  In fact, the 
restricted specification shows  an even sharper rising pattern for  the cross-price elasticities 
between cars of the same subgroup or group. 
Table 3 also  summarizes the price elasticities by origin,  domestic or foreign.  Both the 
restricted and the flexible specification show that the own-price elasticity of domestic cars is 
lower on average that the own-price elasticity of foreign cars. 
23 Table 3.  Substitution patterns (in 1999) 
Own elasticity  Cross elasticities with respect to car from 
same subgroup  same group  different group 
Averages for restricted specification 
all  5.549  .338  .103  .002 
subcompact  3.177  .123  .037  .002 
compact  4.518  .238  .070  .003 
intermediate  5.797  .275  .080  .002 
standard  8.004  .608  .172  .002 
luxury  10.781  .965  .331  .003 
foreign  5.871  .250  .077  .001 
domestic  4.925  .510  .154  .004 
Averages for flexible  specification 
all  4.778  .295  .059  .002 
subcompact  4.743  .259  .019  .002 
compact  3.589  .179  .070  .003 
intermediate  3.670  .156  .047  .002 
standard  8.684  .801  .151  .001 
luxury  4.715  .285  .053  .002 
foreign  5.032  .208  .041  .001 
domestic  4.286  .464  .093  .003 
4.4  Marginal costs 
Based on the demand estimates and the specification of oligopoly pricing before liberaliza-
tion it is  possible to recover the marginal costs.  Recall that we  considered two  alternative 
pricing scenarios, one with full  intrabrand competition within a country and one with lim-
ited intrabrand competition within a  country.  In both scenarios the manufacturing firms 
behave non-cooperatively, maximizing the sum of the profits of all  products in  their port-
folio,  as  reflected by the firms'  product ownership matrix ()F.  The first and third column 
of Table 4 show the 1999 averages of the marginal costs implied by the two pricing models 
(flexible demand specification).  The estimates generaily appear plausible and in line with 
previous estimates obtained in the literature; the implied Lerner indices are in the range of 
20-40%.  A comparison across products further conforms to intuition and previous research. 
For example,  domestic cars on average obtain higher margins than foreign  cars.  The pat-
tern of margins across segments is closely related to the pattern of the own price elasticities 
24 discussed before. 
Comparing the averages  across  countries,  there are sometimes substantial differences. 
In  particular, the marginal cost  of cars sold in the U.K.  appears substantially higher than 
the marginal cost of cars in  the other countries.  This finding is  similar to Goldberg  and 
Verb oven (2001), who analyzed it in detail.  One explanation for the higher marginal costs in 
the U.K. is the presence of extra unmeasured optional equipment, such as radio or insurance. 
Furthermore, the importance of local distribution costs, which may amount to up to up 35% 
of the price of a car, may explain the higher marginal costs during periods when the local 
exchange is overvalued.  In fact, in 1999 the pound had appreciated by about 30% compared 
to 1997, without an accompanying reduction in relative factor prices.  Distribution costs are 
therefore (temporarily) higher in the U.K.  than elsewhere.  Despite these explanations, the 
estimated marginal costs in the U.K. appear rather high compared to the other countries, 
as also pointed out by Goldberg and Verboven. 
An alternative explanation is the presence of collusion in the U.K., so that the markups 
are underestimated and the marginal costs are overestimated when non-cooperative behavior 
is  imposed.  This  possibility cannot be  ruled  out  in light  of the repeated investigations 
by  the U.K.  Competition Commission.  Goldberg and Verb oven  considered the possibility 
of collusion,  by modifying the firms'  product ownership matrix OF  for  the U.K.  market, 
such  that firms  behave  as  maximizing the sum of profits  over  all  products  of the same 
subsegment.  We here take a somewhat more systematic approach.  For every country except 
the reference  country Belgium  we  modify  OF  as  follows.  We  replace the zeros  (denoting 
competing products) on each  row j  in  OF  by a  parameter  ~j' which  is  chosen  in such a 
way that the marginal cost for  product j  equals the marginal cost for  the same product j 
in  Belgium.  One may interpret the parameter  <Pj  as a  "conjectural variation"  parameter, 
capturing deviations from the non-cooperative pricing assumption relative to Belgium.  A 
positive  <Pj  (less  than 1)  means  that the price of product j  is  determined with a  partial 
account for  the effect on competing products  (not in the firm's  own  portfolio),  hence the 
product is set less  in a partially collusive way.  In the extreme case where  <Pj  is equal to 1, 
product j  is priced fully collusively, i.e.  as if the effect on the other products' profits is fully 
taken into account.  Conversely, a negative <Pj  would mean that the price of a product is set 
below the multi-product non-cooperative price.  Constructing the conjectural variations this 
way,  we find that the pricing in France, Germany and Italy appears slightly less competitive 
than multi-product non-cooperative pricing, relative to Belgium, with average estimates of 
<Pj  in the range of 0.18-0.25 under full  intrabrand competition and 0.09-0.22 under limited 
intrabrand competition, see Table 4.  In the U.K. pricing appears to be quite collusive, with 
an average conjectural variation estimate of around 0.8. 
25 In the simulation analysis below we  do not take a position on  whether marginal costs 
differ  across countries  (as  implied by non-cooperative pricing) or whether conduct differs 
(as under the constructed conjectural variations).  We simply report and discuss the results 
based on both extremes, realizing that the truth may lie somewhere in the middle. 
Table 4. Marginal cost estimates and ¢  (in 1999) 
Full intrabrand competition  Limited intrabrand competition 
marginal cost  implied ¢  marginal cost  implied ¢ 
Belgium  11164  0.00  10330  0.00 
France  12124  0.18  11015  0.10 
Germany  11562  0.22  10304  0.09 
Italy  12878  0.25  12045  0.22 
U.K.  16686  0.83  15559  0.81 
Note:  Marginal costs are expressed in Euro. 
5  The effects of liberalization 
We begin the analysis by assuming that full national intrabrand competition already exists 
before liberalization, so the current system does not effectively limit intrabrand competition 
within a country.  This allows us to first focus purely on the effects of increased international 
intrabrand competition, or cross-border trade.  Next we extend the analysis by considering 
the possibility of limited national intrabrand competition before liberalization. This enables 
us to evaluate the cumulative effect from introducing international and national intrabrand 
competition after liberalization. 
Our simulation analysis amounts to numerically computing the new Nash equilibrium 
after  imposing  constraints on international markup differentials,  based  on  the estimates 
obtained for the demand and marginal cost parameters (flexible demand specification).  We 
consider constraints on markup differentials  of 12 percent and 0 percent,  to capture the 
effects of intermediate and strong increased cross-border trade. The 12% number is obviously 
arbitrary. We  extensively experimented with alternative percentage constraints on markup 
differentials, but there are no essential new insights from reporting these results as well. 
5.1  Full national intrabrand competition before liberalization 
Under full national intrabrand competition before liberalization, the impact of liberalization 
amounts to a reduction in the degree  of international price discrimination.  Recent theo-
26 retical work has shown that it is  difficult to draw general conclusions regarding the price, 
profit and welfare effects of eliminating third-degree price discrimination in an oligopolistic 
setting;  for  a survey,  see  Stole  (2001).  Under monopoly,  the elimination of price discrim-
ination typically leads to a price in between the discriminatory prices,  to reduced  profits 
and ambiguous welfare effects.  Things are quite different under oligopoly.  The elimination 
of price discrimination may sometimes lead to prices that are below all the discriminatory 
prices;  see Thisse and Vives'  (1988)  location model, and Corts' (1998)  model with  "all-out 
competition". Furthermore, eliminating price discrimination may sometimes raise the firms' 
profits;  see Holmes  (1989),  but also see Armstrong and Vickers  (2001)  for  a model where 
the elimination of price discrimination reduces profits when competition becomes sufficiently 
intense.  Finally, the welfare effects are even more difficult to predict than under monopoly. 
The reason why  price,  profit  and welfare effects  are more difficult  to sign ex  ante under 
oligopoly is  the presence of a  business-stealing effect  in  addition to the individual profit 
enhancement effect.  Fortunately,  an empirical analysis can still evaluate the effects  from 
reducing or eliminating price discrimination. 
First consider the price effects from introducing a 12% or a 0% constraint on international 
markup differentials.  For each car, we find that there is at least one country where the price 
would fall and at least one country where the price would rise after liberalization.  Hence, 
there are no situations of "all-out competition" where all prices increase (or reverse situations 
where all prices would decrease).  Table 5 provides summary information on the price effects, 
showing the changes  in the price  level  by  country,  and further broken down  by  domestic 
and foreign  cars  in each country.  The price  levels  refer to weighted  price indices,  where 
the weights  are  the  market shares  before  liberalization.  Under  non-cooperative  pricing, 
liberalization would  have the effect of raising the general car price level  in most countries 
except in Germany, though the effects are very modest for  most countries (third and sixth 
column of Table 5).  The overall price increase (for all five  countries) is  between 0.3 and 0.6 
percent.  While the general price levels would  not change much for  the various countries, 
there are fairly substantial relative price changes within each country.  This can especially 
be seen by breaking down the price changes by domestic and foreign cars, see the first  and 
second, and fourth and fifth column of Table 5.  In all countries the price level of domestic 
cars would drop while the price level of foreign  cars would increase.  We  also broke down 
the price changes by market segment (not shown).  While the price changes are somewhat 
stronger in the lower-end segments (subcompact and compact), there do not generally appear 
to be striking differences across market segments. 
Now  consider the price level  changes under partially collusive pricing.  Recall that we 
found that in most countries prices are set close to non-cooperative pricing, except in the 
27 U.K.  where prices appear closer to fully  collusive behavior.  One can see that the changes 
in the price levels now show important differences between countries.  Liberalization would 
raise the price level by between 4%  and 15%  in all countries except the U.K.  In the U.K. 
the price level would drop by about 16-18%.  The intuition for  these contrasting findings 
follows  directly from the different pricing assumptions and the implied computed marginal 
costs  and  markups before  liberalization.  Under  non-cooperative  pricing,  the systematic 
country-level international price differentials are largely driven by cost differences;  markup 
differences only playa role for domestic versus foreign cars.  Under partially collusive pricing, 
systematic country-level price differences are purely driven by markup differences instead of 
cost differences (by construction). It is therefore not surprising to see only modest country-














Table 5. Pe.rcentage price changes after liberalization 
(full national intrabrand competition before liberalization) 
domestic  foreign  all  domestic  foreign 
Non-cooperative pricing 
all 
Max.  markup differential T  = 12%  Max.  markup differential T  = 0% 
- - 1.4  - - 5.0 
-2.1  2.8  0.1  -4.8  6.8  0.4 
-0.7  1.5  -0.2  -2.4  2.6  -1.2 
-3.8  4.0  1.6  -4.8  7.6  3.8 
-2.6  1.7  0.1  -3.6  2.4  0.2 
-1.9  2.4  0.3  -3.3  4.4  0.6 
Partially collusive pricing (¢) 
Max.  markup differential T  = 12%  Max.  markup differential T  = 0% 
- - 13.1  - - 14.6 
5.8  10.6  7.9  6.5  12.1  9.0 
4.7  2.5  4.2  5.3  1.8  4.5 
2.9  4.6  4.1  6.2  4.5  5.0 
-15.1  -16.4  -15.9  -17.6  -18.9  -18.4 
-0.2  -0.8  -0.2  0.1  -1.5  -0.3 
Note:  Results are percentage changes of price indices.  Price indices are weighted average 
price levels using the sales before liberalization as weights. 
Now consider the effects from liberalization on consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
total welfare,  as  summarized in Table 6.  Under non-cooperative pricing consumer surplus 
28 would drop by 244  million Euro or 4.2% in Belgium, and by 736  million Euro, or 3.5%  in 
Italy (when T  = 0%, i.e.  full elimination of discrimination).  In all other countries consumer 
surplus would increase,  but the effects  are small (in the range of 0.5-1.8%).  This shows 
that, consistent with the previously discussed price indices,  under non-cooperative pricing 
the overall effects  on consumers  are relatively modest,  despite the substantial underlying 
changes in relative prices  (in particular domestic versus foreign).  Under partially collusive 
pricing the overall effects on consumers are considerably more important.  Consumers from 
all  countries  except  the U.K.  would  loose,  e.g.  by  up to 1.8  billion  Euro in  France  and 
Germany.  U.K. consumers would gains substantially.  As  before,  this follows  from the fact 
that the large  existing international price differentials  between the U.K.  and the rest of 
Europe are now entirely attributed to markup differences. 
The effects from liberalization on producer surplus are similar whether one considers non-
cooperative or collusive pricing. If  markup differentials would be reduced to a maximum of 
12%, then producer surplus would (slightly) increase, while if markup differentials would be 
fully eliminated, then producer surplus would (again slightly) decrease.  Finally, the effects 
from  liberalization on total welfare  are modest under non-cooperative pricing  (negligible 
increase or decrease), and quite large under partially collusive pricing (increase by 1.6-2.0 
billion Euro). 
This discussion shows the importance of knowing the causes behind the large price dif-
ferentials in the European Union.  If conduct is  similar in all countries (non--cooperative), 
then liberalization may lead to substantial changes for  individual car prices, as illustrated 
by the differences between domestic and foreign cars.  But the overall effects on consumers 
in the various countries, on producers and total welfare would be modest.  In contrast, when 
cross-country differences in conduct lie  behind the systematic international price differen-
tials, then the overall effects on consumers, producers and total welfare may be substantial. 
In light of the previous  discussion  that cost-differences are presumably less  than implied 
by non-cooperative pricing so that conduct may differ at least partly across countries, one 





Table 6.  Welfare changes after liberalization 
(full national intrabrand competition before liberalization) 
Non-cooperative pricing  Partially collusive pricing (¢) 
7= 12%  7=0%  7= 12%  7=0% 
Belgium  -63  (-1.10)  -244  (-4.22)  -662  (-11.49)  -731  (-12.68) 
France  76  (0.32)  167  (0.69)  -1632  (-6.71)  -1820  (-7.48) 
Germany  154  (0.34)  806  (1.80)  -1801  (-4.01)  -1844  (-4.11) 
Italy  -315  (-1.47)  -736  (-3.45)  -509  (-2.38)  -595  (-2.78) 
U.K.  101  (0.39)  122  (0.47)  6133  (23.46)  7258  27.76) 
All  -47  (-0.04)  117  (0.09)  1530  (1.25)  2270  (1.85) 
All  84  (0.15)  -162  (-0.29)  101  (0.16)  -238  (-0.38) 
All  38  (0.02)  -45  (-0.03)  1631  (0.88)  2030  (1.10) 
Note:  Results are changes expressed in millions of Euro. Percentage changes are in paren-
theses. 
5.2  Limited national intrabrand competition before liberalization 
We  now  consider the situation in which the current system effectively limits national in-
trabrand competition before liberalization.  In this case the impact of liberalization will be 
the combined effect  of increasing both national and international intrabrand competition. 
Before looking at the effects on consumer surplus, producer surplus and total welfare (anal-
ogous to the previous section), we address a somewhat different question.  We ask whether 
liberalization would raise or reduce the manufacturers' profits.  An answer to this question 
can shed light on whether manufacturers would want to have adopt the vertical restraints 
even in the absence of efficiencies, such as public good aspects in providing retail services. 
Section 3.2  analyzed manufacturers' pricing under limited national intrabrand compe-
tition.  As  mentioned, Rey and Stiglitz (1995)  show that the double marginalization effect 
mitigates competition between manufacturers.  This may increase the manufacturers' prof-
its and work as  a tacit collusion device, especially when competition is  intense (e.g.  when 
products are close substitutes).  Vertical restraints that limit national intrabrand competi-
tion may therefore sometimes not require any efficiencies to be profitable, in contrast to the 
well-known case where the upstream manufacturer is a monopoly. 
But Rey and Stiglitz' analysis only applies to a single market (or to multiple identical 
markets). With multiple markets and different local demand conditions, the restraints may 
also  be adopted as a mechanism to limit intrabrand competition across markets in order 
to enforce price discrimination across these markets.  In sum, the restraints may be prof-
30 itable even absent efficiencies, for  two potentially anti-competitive reasons:  to limit national 
intrabrand competition (tacit collusion)  and to limit international intrabrand competition 
(price discrimination).  An empirical analysis on the profitability of these possible incentives 
is  therefore necessary,  and we  take the following  approach.  Based on the observation that 
the existing system has been adopted as the result of a cooperative agreement between all 
car manufacturers in the industry (the block exemption), we  compare the manufacturers' 
joint profits before and after removing reform.8 
Table 7 shows the results.  The first row shows the changes in profits when liberalization 
hypothetically only has the effect of creating full national intrabrand competition, and has 
no impact on the extent of international intrabrand competition.  In this case, the only profit 
source from existing system is the tacit collusion device identified by Rey and Stiglitz (so  T 
is  assumed sufficiently high, so that liberalization involves no binding markup constraints). 
The first  row  shows  that liberalization  would  increase joint  profits  by  between  2 and 3 
billion Euro annually.  More detailed calculations showed that liberalization would lower the 
manufacturers' profit margins. But this would be accompanied by a high increase in sales, so 
that the overall effect is an increased profit.  This might lead one to conclude that the current 
system is  not profitable absent efficiencies, so that efficiencies must be present. Yet in light 
of the above it is necessary to also look at the second and third rows, which account for the 
fact that the current system also  has an impact on the extent of international intrabrand 
competition (as before, modelled by setting T  =  12%  or  T  =  0%).  The results show  that 
in both cases the profits would still increase, under non-cooperative pricing even by more. 
Hence,  it turns out that the current system is  not profitable to the manufacturers on anti-
competitive grounds, even if one accounts for both the tacit collusion and international price 
discrimination mechanisms.  Hence, if one is to argue that the scenario of limited national 
intrabrand competition before liberalization is the valid one,  one has to be consistent and 
accept that efficiencies must also  be involved,  since the firms  would otherwise presumably 
not have cooperated to obtain the exemption in the first place. 
8This approach would be more difficult to justify during the seventies, when firms formed bilateral agree-
ments with their dealers.  In this case,  it would be more suitable to directly follow  Rey and Stiglitz' non-
cooperative approach, and compute each individual manufacturer's change in profits when it would remove 
the restraints, given that all other manufacturers keep it. 
31 Table 7.  Changes in manufacturers' profits from liberalization 
(limited national intrabrand competition before liberalization) 
7  is high 
7  = 12% 
7=0% 
Non-cooperative pricing  Partially collusive pricing (¢) 
3032  2174 
3309  1024 
3125  1284 
Note:  Results are changes expressed in millions of Euro. 
Having established that the scenario of limited national intrabrand competition before 
liberalization only applies if there are efficiencies, we now look at the various welfare effects 
from liberalizing the distribution system.  The results have to be taken with great caution 
since they would need to be balanced against possibly large efficiency losses.  The general 
price level in Europe would decrease by between 8-10% in most countries, especially in the 
U.K. under partially collusive pricing.  (Results, the analogue of Table 5,  are not shown). 
Table 8 shows the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and total welfare caused 
by liberalization.  Notice first that producer surplus (the sum of both the manufacturers' and 
retailers' profits) drops substantially because of liberalization, whether price discrimination 
is eliminated partly (7 =  12%) or completely (7 =  0%).  In contrast, consumer surplus would 
increase substantially, by about 10--13% at the European level (consistent with the percentage 
drops in the general  price levels  reported before).  Only consumer  in Belgium would  be 
worse off,  at least under partially collusive pricing.  The overall effect  on  total welfare is 
a  substantial increase,  by between  6  and 8  billion  Euro.  At  first  sight,  it appears that 
the conclusions obtained under the scenario of full  national intrabrand competition before 
liberalization differ  rather drastically.  Recall,  however,  that we  found that the currently 
considered scenario  must involve fairly large efficiencies.  Hence  liberalizing the system if 
the current scenario applies, may involve the elimination of considerable efficiencies.  If one 
would account for  these, the total welfare effects may actually lie  much closer to the ones 




Table 8.  Welfare changes after liberalization. 
(limited national intrabrand competition before liberalization) 
Non-cooperative pricing  Partially collusive pricing 
7= 12%  7=0%  7= 12%  7=0% 
Belgium  303  (5.25)  102  (1. 78)  -162  (-2.82)  -205  (-3.55) 
France  2508  (10.31)  2603  (10.71)  583  (2.40)  415  (1. 70) 
Germany  5344  (11.92)  6097  (13.60)  2697  (6.02)  2678  (5.97) 
Italy  1379  (6.45)  885  (4.14)  2634  (12.33)  2130  (9.97) 
U.K.  2541  (9.72)  2567  (9.82)  9274  (35.46)  10403  (39.78) 
All  12074  (9.86)  12254  (10.01)  15027  (12.27)  15419  (12.60) 
All  -5394  (-8.25)  -5686  (-8.70)  -7324  (-10.54)  -7026  (-10.12) 
All  6680  (3.56)  6567  (3.50)  7702  (4.01)  8393  (4.37) 
Note:  Results are changes expressed in millions of Euro. Percentage changes are in paren-
theses. 
6  Conclusions and extensions 
Our analysis has investigated how the liberalization of vertical restraints may affect consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and total welfare.  Some of our main findings are as follows.  If  the 
existing system already entails sufficient national intrabrand competition, then liberalization 
mainly improves international intrabrand competition, and so leads to a reduction in inter-
national price discrimination.  Total total welfare may increase by an amount between zero 
and 1.6-2 billion Euro per year. If  the existing system effectively limits national intrabrand 
competition, then liberalization may lead to both reduced international price discrimination 
and to the elimination of tacit collusion. The computed welfare gains become much larger, 
yet one must now also account for potentially large efficiencies losses since the existing system 
would be hard to rationalize without efficiencies from the industry's point of view. 
The analysis may be extended in several ways.  First,  one might account for  the fact 
that industry restructuring may take place in  response to liberalization.  Assuming that 
firms incur fixed costs, they may no longer be able to recover those after liberalization.  One 
might investigate what the effects would be when liberalization measures triggers mergers or 
other horizontal agreements.  Second, it would be interesting to analyze the effects in high 
tax countries in more detail.  We  have focused here on the incentives for  international price 
discrimination induced by the current system.  Yet an issue that has received less attention 
is that the current system also provides incentives to individual countries to implement tax 
discrimination. While V.A.T. is now similar between countries, other taxes are far from being 
33 harmonized across Europe. Some countries apply registration and other taxes amounting to 
over 100% of the purchase price.  These are countries that typically do not have much local 
production (e.g.  Danmark, Greece).  It is clear that the incentives for tax discrimination by 
governments may be seriously reduced when the distribution system is  liberalized.  Firms 
currently charge lower  markups in the high tax countries to stimulate demand,  but they 
would no longer be willing to do so in an integrated market as it would attract too many 
foreign consumers.  Hence markups would  increase in  the high tax countries, which would 
lead to lower  demand and tax revenues.  This would  in turn induce local governments to 
bring their taxes more in line with those of other European countries,  possibly implying 
important additional welfare changes. 
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8  Appendix. 
8.1  The selective and exclusive distribution system 
This part of the appendix provides a  detailed discussion on the essential features of selec-
tivity and exclusivity, to demonstrate their impact on national and international intrabrand 
competition. 
Until 1985 the relationships between the car manufacturers and their dealers were reg-
ulated through individual exemption decisions by the European Commission.  In 1985,  the 
Commission decided to adopt a block exemption regulation, Regulation 123/85, applicable 
to the whole industry. The block exemption allowed for two main restrictions in distribution: 
selectivity and territorial exclusivity.  In addition, non-compete clauses (or  "exclusive deal-
ing"  arrangements) and other restrictions were allowed.  In 1995, the Commission adopted a 
new block exemption, Regulation 1475/95, expiring in September 2002.  The basic principles 
remained unchanged, though some of the restrictions were relaxed to stimulate competition. 
We  summarize the main properties of the distribution system as  it exists since 1995.  For 
further details, including a comparison between the 1985 and 1995 system, we refer to the 
European Commission (2000)  and the U.K Competition Commission (2000). 
36 Selectivity and exclusivity 
Selective and exclusive distribution agreements have in common that they restrict the number 
of authorized distributors and the possibilities of resale.9  The difference lies  in how these 
restrictions work,  see Table 1 for  a  summary.  Selectivity means that each  manufacturer 
can set qualitative and quantitative criteria on its distributors.  Qualitative criteria are, for 
example, minimum standards as regards training of staff, advertizing and storage, and most 
notably, the obligation to provide after-sales repair and maintenance services.  Quantitative 
criteria allow the manufacturer to restrict the total number of dealers and to impose annual 
sales targets.  To protect the selectivity of the distribution system, the manufacturer can 
prohibit its dealers to sell cars to independent resellers.  Dealers may thus only sell to end-
consumers, to intermediaries with a written authorization from consumers, or to other dealers 
within the manufacturer's network. 
Territorial exclusivity refers to the manufacturers' right to appoint only one dealer in a 
geographically limited territory.  The appointed dealers must not maintain branches outside 
their own contract territory, i.e.  a "location clause" is permitted. Dealers have to concentrate 
their marketing efforts on their own territory and are restricted from an active sales policy 
in other territories. While they can advertize in media that cover a wider area than their 
own territory, personalized advertizing campaigns outside their territory are forbidden. 
We  focus  on the two main potential anti-competitive effects from  the selective and ex-
clusive distribution system.  Both effects concern a reduction of intrabrand competition, i.e. 
competition between dealers selling the same brand.  First, the system may restrict inter-
national intrabrand competition,  i.e.  opportunities for  cross-border trade, and thus lie at 
the basis of large international price differentials.  Second, the system has the potential of 
reducing national intrabrand competition and thereby creating tacit collusion  among the 
manufacturers. 
Table 1. Selective versus exclusive distribution 
Distribution  Restriction imposed on 
authorized distributors  possibilities of resale 
Selective  qualitative and quantitative criteria  no sales to independent reseller 
Exclusive  geographic territory  no active selling in other territory 
Effects on international intrabrand competition and price discrimination 
9See the Commission Notice in O.J. 2000/C 291/01 of 13.10.2000 on Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
paragraph (184). 
37 When selectivity and territorial exclusivity are not combined,  the opportunities for  inter-
national intrabrand competition, or cross-border trade, are not seriously affected.  Suppose 
there is selectivity without exclusivity.  While the selected dealers are then restricted from 
selling to independent resellers, they can set up their own branches abroad to take advantage 
of existing price differentials. Furthermore, the dealers can engage in active cross-border sales 
policies such as  personalized advertizing.  Conversely, suppose there is  exclusivity without 
selectivity.  Although the exclusive dealers cannot set up their own  branches abroad, they 
can sell to independent resellers who may exploit the price differentials.  Hence when selectiv-
ity and exclusivity are not combined, international price differentials are constrained by the 
arbitrage activities of either the foreign  branches of the selected dealers or the independent 
resellers. 
In contrast, when selectivity and exclusivity are both adopted together, the possibilities 
for cross-border trade become limited. It can then only take place directly by end-consumers, 
by  intermediaries with a  written authorization from  consumers,  or  by dealers within the 
manufacturer's network.  An "availability clause" aims to guarantee the cross-border supply. 
It states that dealers should be able to obtain cars with foreign  specifications from their 
manufacturers (e.g.  right-hand drive cars for  the U.K.  market).  In practice, however,  the 
system of quantitative sales targets (including the associated bonus schemes) severely limits 
the cross-border supply and thus the possibilities for arbitrage.  Most manufacturers link the 
allocation of new cars to their dealers to the agreed sales targets.  As  a result, the dealers 
cannot supply any amount they want; they are constrained by the sales targets.  They are 
thus inclined to first  serve their local  customers  to whom they can also  offer  after-sales 
services.  Supply is  further limited because the dealers  must sell the whole  model range. 
This means that dealers can in practice only get sufficient numbers of an attractive model 
if they also take a number of less attractive models.  The conclusion is that the system does 
not hamper the availability of cars to customers within the dealers' territory, but may lead 
to long delivery lags (or excessive surcharges) for other customers. 
To which extent do end-consumers, intermediaries and other dealers face  other restric-
tions, in addition to the limited cross-border supply? 
(i) The rights of end-consumers to purchase a car abroad are in principle best pro-
tected. A 1985 Commission Notice formally states that consumers who purchase 
their car abroad must not face  excessive delivery lags or refusals to carry out 
warranty workS.lO  The benefits from the distribution system may be withdrawn 
lOSee the Commission Notice in O.J. 1985/C17/03 of 18.1.1985 on the rights of consumers and the tolerance 
levels for price differentials. 
38 if international  price differentials  exceed  12%  for  more  than a year,  or exceed 
18% for a shorter period.  In practice, foreign consumers have in fact often faced 
long delivery  lags or  have  had to pay higher prices than domestic  consumers, 
see BEUC (1992)  and its previous studies for  anecdotal evidence.  Furthermore, 
international price differentials  have regularly exceeded the thresholds without 
initiating a formal investigation by the Commission. 
(ii) The rights of intermediaries with a written authorization from end-consumers 
are formally restricted by a 1991  NoticeY  To  ensure that they do  not act like 
independent  resellers,  they must  avoid  carrying a  common  name;  they must 
not use supermarkets as outlets; and they must quote their prices only as  "best 
estimates". Furthermore, intermediaries and dealers may not establish privileged 
relationships with each other, in the form of favorable conditions or sales amounts 
exceeding 10%  of the dealers sales. 
(iii)  The dealers who want to purchase from other dealers of their network also 
face  additional restrictions.  The sales  targets are not only responsible for  the 
limited cross-border supply as discussed above.  The U.K. Competition Commis-
sion  (2000)  reports an interesting additional effect.  Many manufacturers seem 
to determine whether the sales targets are met by counting only the cars that 
the dealers obtain directly from the manufacturers, and not the cars they ob-
tain from foreign dealers.  Dealers will therefore have a great difficulty in meeting 
their sales target if most of their sales to local customers are sourced from foreign 
dealers rather than from the manufacturer.  Note that a similar effect would arise 
if the manufacturer would exclude the sales sourced from foreign  dealers when 
determining the bonus payments, but this is a black practice according to the 
regulation. 
In  summary, this discussion makes clear the selective and exclusive distribution system 
contains several restrictions that limits international intrabrand competition, or cross-border 
trade.  Further support for this conclusion comes from the large international price differen-
tials together with the low extent of parallel imports (in the range of 0-2% of total sales), 
as previously documented by e.g.  BEUC (1992) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001). 
Effects on national intrabrand competition and tacit collusion 
Selectivity and exclusivity may have  an additional anti-competitive effect,  relating to 
intrabrand competition within a country.  As  analyzed by  Rey and Stiglitz (1995),  a  lim-
l1See the Commission Notice in O.J. 1991/C 329 of 18.12.1991 on the obligations of intermediaries. 
39 ited degree of national intrabrand competition creates a double marginalization effect, which 
serves to reduce the degree of competition between the manufacturers (interbrand compe-
tition).  As a result, both the dealers' retail prices and the manufacturers' wholesale prices 
may be higher than the noncooperative Bertrand prices, and manufacturers may succeed in 
obtaining larger profits, a form of tacit collusion between the manufacturers. 
Does the current system effectively reduce the extent of intrabrand competition within 
a country, and thus potentially create tacit collusion?  It is  not obvious that this is the case. 
As  discussed above,  dealers can engage in non-personalized advertizing campaigns outside 
the territory.  The U.K.  Competition Commission (2000)  quotes the number of 39% as the 
proportion of out-of-territory sales.  Based on the fact that most of the population lives in 
urban areas and commutes to different areas, the Competition Commission interprets this 
to be a small proportion, and concludes that intrabrand competition is relatively weak; see 
2.117 and 2.322 in Competition Commission (2000).  Nevertheless, the proportion suggests 
that consumers do purchase in other territories, so that intrabrand competition is potentially 
present to at least some extent. 
Other features of the distribution system 
The manufacturers can also place additional restrictions to their dealers, apart from selectiv-
ity and territorial exclusivity.  In particular, they are allowed to adopt non-compete clauses, 
or  "exclusive dealing"  arrangements.  This limits the dealers' possibilities to sell cars from 
different manufacturers.  Multiple brands can only be sold if this is done under separate man-
agement, in the form of a distinct legal entity and in separate showrooms to avoid confusion 
between brands.  In practice, most dealers sell only one brand; exceptions occur in the rural 
areas of the Nordic countries. 
The manufacturers should allow access to their dealer network by independent spare part 
producers.  The dealers thus have the right to use spare parts from these suppliers, provided 
that they are of "matching quality" . 
Although the selectivity imposes dealers to provide after sales services, independent re-
pairers may also be active.  They should have access to the necessary technical information 
so  as  to provide maintenance and repair services.  Repairs that fall under the warranty are 
to be carried out by the authorized dealers. 
The 2002 proposals for liberalization 
In light of the expiration of the current distribution system in September 2002, the Commis-
sion has proposed a  revised system.  On the one hand, the new system is  potentially more 
liberal than the current system; on the other hand, it gives the manufacturers more choice. 
The main proposal is to allow the manufacturers to impose either selectivity or exclusivity on 
40 their dealers, but no longer a combination of both. Note that this is effectively a stricter than 
the general exemption granted to vertical restraints.  This is  because of the Commission's 
fear  of cumulative effects,  i.e.  the competitive effects when a  large group of firms  adopts 
the vertical restraints simultaneously.  More specifically, if manufacturers adopt a selective 
agreement, their dealers can open foreign outlets, since they are no longer subject to a loca-
tion clause.12  If manufacturers adopt an exclusive agreement, dealers have the right to sell 
to independent resellers,  who do not need a written authorization from  consumers.13  Fur-
thermore, some of the conditions of selectivity and exclusivity are weakened.  For example, 
the intermediaries who can trade under selectivity provided they have a written consumer 
authorization,  are no  longer restricted to purchase at most  10%  of a  dealer's total sales. 
Similarly,  manufacturers can no longer impose sales targets (and bonus schemes)  based on 
a territory that is smaller than the E. U.  This should prevent the risk of a limited supply to 
dealers selling intensively abroad. 
Other proposals are to facilitate the dealers' possibilities to sell cars from different manu-
facturers, and to reduce the link between new car sales and after-sales services.  Although all 
of these proposals may affect the nature of competition in the market, we choose to focus on 
the main proposal, relating to selectivity and territorial exclusivity.  Our focus  also refiects 
the Commission's own  interests.  Before publishing its reform proposals,  the Commission 
had requested a comparative study (carried out by Andersen) to evaluate the effects from 
five  alternative distribution systems, each being a  different  combination of selectivity and 
exclusivity. 
8.2  Constrained Nash equilibrium 
This part of the appendix illustrates the computation of a constrained candidate Nash equi-
librium.  Suppose all constraints are nonbinding, except product j's constraint for  country 
pair (1,2), for which: 
(16) 
In this case, the only nonzero Lagrange multiplier is  Aj12.  Hence the first-order conditions 
with respect to price reduce to the standard unconstrained first-order conditions: 
12The abolishment of the location clause is subject to a transition period until 1 October 2005.  Further-
more, it only applies to passenger cars, and not to trucks, buses and coaches. 
l30ne might argue that the possibility to sell to independent resellers undermines the principle of territorial 
exclusivity.  However,  the independent resellers retain a  substantial competitive disadvantage against the 
authorized exclusive dealers, who have faster access to supply, etc ... 
41 (17) 
for  all j' -=I  j, or for j' = j  and m' -=I  1,2, while they reduce to: 
(18) 
for  product j  in markets 1 and 2.  This can be interpreted as follows.  Since Ajl2  2':  0 (and 
assuming a concave profit function), the first equality implies that product j's price in market 
1 is  below its unconstrained optimum; the second equality implies that product j's price in 
market 2 is  above its unconstrained optimum.  Notice the importance of the market sizes 
11  and 1 2,  When 11 is large relative to 1 2,  the price in market 1 will be close to (but still 
below) the unconstrained optimum in market 1,  whereas the price in market 2 will be far 
from  (and above)  the unconstrained optimum in  market 2.  The reverse conclusion  holds 
when 11 is small relative to 1 2, 
To compute the candidate Nash equilibrium, substitute Aj12 out of (18) to obtain: 
(19) 
The candidate Nash equilibrium is given by the solution p* to the system of equations 
given by  (??)-(17)-(19).  It remains to verify whether at the solution to this system  (i)  no 
active constraint is unjustified, i.e.: 
\  ((  *)  "(P*  -)  aSk1(Pi))  1  0  Aj12 =  Sjl PI  + ~ k1  - mCkl  a *  1  2':  , 
kEFfl  PJ1 
and whether (ii) no inactive constraint is violated, i.e.  (1 +T)(Pj'n -mcj'n) - (Pj'm' -mcj'n') > 
o  for all j'  -=I  j, or for j' = j  and m' -=I  1,2. 
42 This example immediately generalizes to cases in which at most one constraint is binding 
for several products.  When two or more constraints per product are binding, there are two 
or more nonzero Lagrange multipliers per product.  These multipliers may be substituted 
out in an analogous way as in the above example. 
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